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ABSTRACT 
The Refugee Act of 1980 was a significant piece of legislation for the development 
of asylum law, and the United States’ commitment to human rights and humanitarian 
concern for the struggles of refugees worldwide. The Act recognized the urgent 
needs of persons fleeing persecution in their homelands, asylees, and their need for 
protection and resettlement. The protections afforded in the Act extended to asylum 
seekers that were persecuted on the basis of (1) race, (2) religion, (3) nationality, (4) 
membership in a particular social group, or (5) political opinion. However, Congress 
did not define “membership in a particular social group” in the Refugee Act of 1980 
or otherwise, and have left it to the Board of Immigration Appeals to interpret the 
term “membership in particular social group.” As such, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals has developed, through case law, an arbitrary and loose definition 
for “membership in a particular social group.” With such arbitrariness, as discussed 
in this Article, any group, including former gang members fleeing their country and 
seeking asylum could make a cognizable claim that they are a “member of 
a particular social group,” and therefore ought to be afforded protections under the 
Refugee Act of 1980.   
  
This Article examines the history of asylum law that developed after the passing of 
the Refugee Act of 1980, specifically the “particular social group” standard as it was 
developed through Board of Immigration Appeals decisions, and a brief history of 
the development of the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs in the Northern Triangle of 
Central America. Ultimately, this Article examines a circuit court split on whether 
former gang members constitute a “particular social group.” This Article takes the 
position that former gang members do constitute a “particular social group,” and thus 
should be afforded asylum protections. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
magine this: you are born in El Salvador, fatherless, and in extreme 
poverty. You fall into a neighborhood gang, the Mara Salvatrucha 
13,1 where gang leaders order you to extort your neighbors. You are 
beaten when you resist and threatened with death when you try to quit 
the gang. You no longer feel safe and flee to the United States seeking 
protection. 
A gang member renouncing his gang membership and fleeing to 
the United States is essentially a death wish. Former gang members 
who flee to the United States in search of asylum protection are fleeing 
violent persecution from the gangs to which they used to be loyal. This 
is the factual circumstance of five federal courts of appeals cases, 
where repentant former gang members have fled to the United States 
in search of asylum protections; three petitioners have been successful 
in their argument that they are members of a “particular social group,”2 
and two petitioners have not been successful.3  
This Article will demonstrate that the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First and Ninth Circuits, which ruled against the 
asylum seekers, erred in their decisions when they ruled that former 
gang members do not constitute a “particular social group.”4 Part II of 
this Article will provide background on the gang culture that exists in 
Central America. Part III of this Article will provide a brief overview 
of asylum law, and the development of the “particular social group” 
standard.5 Part IV will provide relevant case law and discuss the five 
circuit court cases that have created the current circuit court split.6 Part 
                                                 
1 See Sonja Wolf, Mara Salvatrucha: The Most Dangerous Street Gang in the 
Americas?, 54 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 65, 65 (2012). 
2 See Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 905-06 (4th Cir. 2014); Urbina-Mejia v. 
Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 2010); Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 431 
(7th Cir. 2009). 
3 See Garay Reyes v. Lynch 842 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2016); Cantarero v. 
Holder, 734 F.3d 82, 85-87 (1st Cir. 2013). 
4 Garay Reyes, 842 F.3d at 1129; Cantarero, 734 F.3d at 85-87. 
5 Hereinafter the terms “member of a particular social group” and “particular 
social group” are meant as terms of art and will be referenced without quotation 
marks. The term is an element of the asylum standard carved out through case 
law by the Board of Immigration Appeals. 
6 See generally Garay Reyes, 842 F.3d 1125; Cantarero, 734 F.3d 82; Martinez, 
740 F.3d 902; Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d 360; Ramos, 589 F.3d 426. 
I 
196 UMass Law Review v. 13 | 192 
V of this Article will discuss the procedural aspect of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals decisions.7 Part VI will offer an analysis of how 
the inconsistency of the Board of Immigration Appeals, in its 
application of the particular social group standard, has set the stage for 
the current circuit split.8 The best resolution to this split is by having 
circuit courts consider former gang members as a particular social 
group because they meet the requirements of the standard.9 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Northern Triangle: The Culture and Origins of the MS-13 
and Mara 18 
Gangs have terrorized Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador (“the 
Northern Triangle”)10 since the 1990s.11 The Northern Triangle is now 
home to two of the largest and most violent gangs, the Barrios 18 (“M-
18” or “18th Street”) and the Mara Salvatrucha (“MS-13”).12 Both 
gangs began in the inner-city of Los Angeles, California in response to 
exclusion from already existing gangs comprised of other ethnicities.13 
                                                 
7 See Kathleen Kersh, An Insurmountable Obstacle: Denying Deference to the 
BIA’s Social Visibility Requirement 19 MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 153, 166 (2013). 
8 Christopher J. Preston, Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Particular and 
Socially Visible Masses: The Eighth Circuit’s New Standard Governing 
Particular Social Group Asylum Applications After Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 
678 (8th Cir. 2012), 92 NEB. L. REV. 431, 443 (2013). 
9 See, e.g., Martinez, 740 F.3d 902. 
10 Cynthia J. Arnson & Eric L. Olson, Introduction, in ORGANIZED CRIME IN 
CENTRAL AMERICA: THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE, 1, 1 (Cynthia J. Arnson & Eric 
L. Olson ed., 2011) (El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala are part of the 
Northern Triangle area of Central America, also known as just “the Northern 
Triangle.”). 
11   See Steven S. Dudley, Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: 
Transportistas, Mexican Cartels, and Maras, in ORGANIZED CRIME IN CENTRAL 
AMERICA: THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE 18, 41 (Cynthia J. Arnson & Eric L. Olson 
ed., 2011); Jillian N. Blake, Gang and Cartel Violence: A Reason to Grant 
Political Asylum from Mexico and Central America, 38 YALE J. OF INT’L L. 
ONLINE 31, 32-34 (2012) [hereinafter Blake, Gang and Cartel Violence]; Juan J. 
Fogelbach, Gangs, Violence, and Victims in El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 417, 418 (2011). 
12 Blake, Gang and Cartel Violence, supra note 11, at 32; Dudley, supra note 11, 
at 41; Fogelbach, supra note 11, at 420. 
13 Blake, Gang and Cartel Violence, supra note 11, at 32; Fogelbach, supra note 
11, at 420-21. 
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The 18th Street gang was created in the 1960s by Mexican-American 
youth in the Rampart neighborhood of Los Angeles; the gang grew to 
incorporate members of various ethnicities, including “Central 
Americans as they arrived in large numbers in the 1980s.”14 Many Los 
Angeles based MS-13 and M-18 gang members were refugees who 
fled civil war violence in El Salvador and Guatemala during the 1980s, 
and were living illegally in the United States.15 Some Central 
American refugees joined the already established gangs; however, 
most Salvadoran youth complained of being victimized by the 
established gangs and formed their own gang, MS-13, exclusively for 
Salvadoran youth.16 
In the late 1990s, many Central American refugees, especially 
those that were involved in gangs, were deported back to their 
countries of origin after the implementation of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.17 The United 
States facilitated the removal of young men, who had entered the 
United States illegally, and were involved in criminal and gang-related 
activity.18 Most of the deportees were young men who had joined 
gangs, and served time in U.S. prisons.19 Ultimately, many of these 
young men were deported back to their country of origin, “despite 
often having no family there, and having limited or non-existent 
                                                 
14 Fogelbach, supra note 11, at 420. 
15 Blake, Gang and Cartel Violence, supra note 11, at 32; Fogelbach, supra note 
11, at 420-21.  
16 Fogelbach, supra note 11, at 420-21. 
17 Fogelbach, supra note 11, at 421; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, tit. 3 §§ 303-05, 110 Stat. 
3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1996)); see 
generally Dara Lind, The Disastrous, Forgotten 1996 Law That Created 
Today’s Immigration Problem, VOX (Apr. 28, 2016, 8:40 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2016/4/28/11515132/iirira-clinton-immigration 
[https://perma.cc/8CKL-YMNR]. 
18 Blake, Gang and Cartel Violence, supra note 11, at 32; Fogelbach, supra 
note11, at 421. 
19 See Joshua Keating, The Unintended Consequences of Deporting Criminals, 
SLATE (Feb. 23, 2017, 12:41 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2017/02/23/deporting_criminals_to_cent
ral_america_helped_cause_the_same_violence_that.html 
[https://perma.cc/RMU2-MNAD]; see also Clare Ribando Seelke, Gangs in 
Central America, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1, 3 (Aug. 29, 2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf [https://perma.cc/B43K-MF4A]. 
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Spanish language skills.”20 The newly deported gang members 
depended on each other and replicated the gang culture they had 
learned in the United States.21 “Gang cliques”22 were established in 
Central America and have since grown to a total of approximately 
“36,000 [gang members] in Honduras, 10,500 in El Salvador, and 
14,000 in Guatemala.”23 
There are approximately nine hundred gang cliques currently 
operating within the Northern Triangle.24 Operationally, the cliques 
have a sophisticated power structure, but do not have a centralized 
leader making the decisions.25 Instead, the gangs are “composed of 
numerous vertically-organized, cooperative cliques” with local bosses 
and leaders at a municipal level.26 Leadership within the gang usually 
begins with a neighborhood clique leader, followed by “municipal 
leaders, department leaders, leaders for gang members outside of 
prison, prison gang leaders, country leaders, and ultimately 
international leaders.”27 Most gang recruits are associated with certain 
risk factors that make them vulnerable to gangs.28 These factors 
include: “conditions of poverty, family disintegration or separation, 
neglect, violent domestic environments, unemployment, scarcity of 
educational and developmental opportunities, and family membership 
in gangs.”29 The gangs in the Northern Triangle offer social 
                                                 
20 Douglas Farah, Organized Crime in El Salvador: Its Homegrown and 
Transnational Dimensions, in ORGANIZED CRIME IN CENTRAL AMERICA: THE 
NORTHERN TRIANGLE 104, 112 (Cynthia J. Arnson & Eric L. Olson ed., 2011). 
21 Id. 
22 Jennifer J. Adams & Jesenia M. Pizarro, MS-13: A Gang Profile, 16 J. GANG 
RES. 1, 4 (2009) (“The MS-13 [and 18th Street gang are] divided into subgroups 
called cliques; each clique has its own name and is in charge of defending a 
certain amount of territory. For example, in Los Angeles, a clique of sixty-five 
members was in charge of patrolling thirty-three street blocks. Each clique is 
independent of one another, but they will band together in response to a 
perceived threat. Cliques may also work together in some criminal activities, 
such as dealing drugs and selling weapons.”). 
23 Dudley, supra note 11, at 42; Fogelbach, supra note 11, at 420. 
24 Fogelbach, supra note 11, at 422. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 424. 
29 Id. 
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acceptance and an alternative way to acquire certain goods to which 
individuals might not otherwise have access.30 Due to the risk factors 
many youth face, they turn to gangs in search of “protection, a social 
and substitute family network, and a source of livelihood.”31 
Much of the ongoing social violence in the Northern Triangle is 
attributable to gang-based criminal activity.32 Extremely high levels of 
homicide have resulted from gang violence perpetuated against 
citizens of the Northern Triangle.33 This area is the most violent region 
in the world.34 In 2015, the Northern Triangle recorded over 17,422 
homicides, an 11 percent increase over the previous year.35 Gang 
culture in the Northern Triangle is so ingrained within the culture that 
in El Salvador there is a saying: “if you’re not in a gang, then you’re 
against gangs.”36 Recruitment for the gangs is focused on integrating 
street children that are vulnerable to the gangs, taking them off the 
streets and providing them with a better standard of living.37 In 
addition to recruiting street children, gangs also recruit in and around 
schools, going as far as demanding payment from schools and 
harassing students.38 Most often, gangs “coerce, intimidate, or force 
[vulnerable] children to deliver messages; stand as lookouts; and 
                                                 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 426-27. 
32 Id. at 437; see also Michael Shifter, Countering Criminal Violence in Central 
America, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS: CENTER FOR PREVENTATIVE 
ACTION 1, 7 (Apr. 2012), https://cfrd8-
files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2012/03/Criminal_Violence_CSR64.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D89A-QXKQ]. 
33 Fogelbach, supra note 11, at 439-41; see Rocio Cara Labrador & Danielle 
Renwick, Central America’s Violent Northern Triangle, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL. 1, 4 (last updated Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle 
[https://perma.cc/D2WW-ZNLX]. 
34 Arnson & Olson, supra note10, at 1-2, 28-30; Fogelbach, supra note 11, at 440; 
see generally Labrador & Renwick, supra note 33. 
35 AFP, El Salvador Becomes World’s Most Deadly Country Outside a War Zone, 
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 5, 2016, 11:15 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/centralamericaandthecaribbean/els
alvador/12083903/El-Salvador-becomes-worlds-most-deadly-country-outside-a-
war-zone.html [perma.cc/7QL8-EJUV]. 
36 Fogelbach, supra note 11, at 429. 
37 Id. at 432. 
38 Id. 
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distribute drugs, weapons, and liquor,” and sometimes even “rob or 
kill.”39 Sometimes, gang members decide they do not want to be a part 
of such violence and choose to disassociate themselves from the 
gang.40 Members must seek permission to leave the gang, and those 
that are not given permission or do not ask for permission are 
“considered traitors, and according to gang norms, all cliques are 
notified and have the ‘green light’ to kill them.”41 Fearing retaliation, 
defecting gang members flee their countries, leaving everything 
behind, including their families, in search of asylum protection in the 
United States.42 
III. THE BASICS OF ASYLUM LAW 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which was amended 
by the Refugee Act of 1980 to include “explicit asylum provisions . . . 
for the first time,” confers upon the Attorney General of the United 
States the authority to grant asylum to any eligible refugee.43 The INA 
defines a refugee as: 
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such 
person’s nationality . . . who is unable or unwilling to 
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or 
herself of the protection of, that country because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.44 
                                                 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 435-36. 
41 Id. at 436. 
42 See id. at 462. 
43 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2014) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. §1103 et seq.); see also 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1103(a)(1) (2009); see also Edward M. Kennedy, Refugee Act of 1980, 15 
INT’L MIGRATION REV., 141, 143 (1981); see also Ivan A. Tereschenko, The 
Board of Immigration Appeals’ Continuous Search for the Definition of 
“Membership in A Particular Social Group” in Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter 
of W-G-R-: In the Context of Youth Resistant to Gang Recruitment in Central 
America, 30 CONN. J. INT’L L. 93, 99 (2014). 
44 Immigration and Nationality Act, § 1101(a)(42). 
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The INA’s definition of refugee is derived from the 1951 Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol, two key international provisions governing the 
protection of refugees.45 In 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed into 
law the Refugee Act of 1980, which adopted the United Nations’ 1951 
Refugee Convention (the “1951 Convention”), relating to the status of 
refugees.46 This Act allows individuals fleeing from their home 
countries to petition for asylum in the United States.47 The Act 
requires individuals to demonstrate “a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.”48 There is no statutory 
definition for the particular social group categorization, nor does 
legislative history provide an exact definition, this Article’s focus is to 
further analyze and define the particular social group category.49 
A. Development of the Particular Social Group Standard 
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) defined particular social 
group in the seminal case Matter of Acosta, as “persons of similar 
background, habits, or social status.”50 The BIA applied the doctrine of 
ejusdem generis to develop guidelines for construing the particular 
social group standard.51 The Board held that each of the four 
categories (race, religion, nationality and political opinion): 
                                                 
45 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, at art. 1 § 2, 19 U.S.T. 6225, 606 
U.N.T.S 267 (Jan. 31, 1967); United Nations Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, at art. 1, 2545 U.N.T.S 38 (July 28, 1951); see also Tereschenko, 
supra note 43, at 99. 
46 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. § 1521 et seq. (1952)); see 
generally Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A 
Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1981); 
see also Kennedy, supra note 43, at 141. 
47  See generally Kennedy, supra note 43, at 141; see also Anker & Posner, supra 
note 46, at 9. 
48 Refugee Act, § 201 (emphasis added). 
49 Tereschenko, supra note 43, at 99. 
50 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985). Matter of Acosta was 
overruled in part by Matter of Mogharrabi where the court held “that the ‘clear 
probability’ standard and the ‘well-founded fear’ standard are not meaningfully 
different and, in practical application, converge. That portion of [the decision] in 
Matter of Acosta has therefore been effectively overruled.” Matter of 
Mogharrabi 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 441 (BIA 1987). 
51 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. at 233 (explaining that the ejusdem generis doctrine 
literally translates to “of the same kind” and “holds that general words used in 
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describes persecution aimed at an immutable 
characteristic: a characteristic that either is beyond the 
power of an individual to change or is so fundamental 
to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be 
required to be changed . . . . [And the phrase] 
“persecution on account of membership in a particular 
social group” to mean persecution that is directed 
toward an individual who is a member of a group of 
persons all of whom share a common, immutable 
characteristic.52 
Following Matter of Acosta, the BIA applied the particular social 
group test in two important cases that have helped shape asylum law,53 
Matter of Toboso-Alfonso,54 and In re Fauziya Kasinga.55 Each case, 
                                                                                                                   
an enumeration with specific words should be construed in a manner consistent 
with the specific words.”). 
52 Id. 
53 See Particular Social Group Practice Advisory: Applying for Asylum After 
Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. 1, 1 
(2014), 
https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/PSG%2520Practice%2520A
dvisory%2520and%2520Appendices-Final-1.22.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SE9-
65F2] [hereinafter Applying for Asylum]; see also Jillian Blake, Getting to 
Group Under U.S. Asylum Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 167, 168 
(2015) [hereinafter Blake, Getting to Group]. 
54 See generally Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (BIA 1990) 
(holding that homosexuals in Cuba were a particular social group for purposes 
of asylum). The Cuban government persecuted applicant because of his sexual 
orientation as a homosexual man. Id. at 820. Applicant testified that being 
homosexual was a criminal offense in Cuba, and that the government had 
allowed the Union of Community Youth to demonstrate against homosexuals at 
his workplace. Id. at 821. Because of his homosexuality, applicant was forced to 
work in a labor camp for 60 days. Id. 
55 See In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (BIA 1996) (holding that 
“young women who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern 
Togo who have not been subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by 
that tribe, and who opposed the practice,” were a protected particular social 
group). Applicant was a 19-year-old female of Togo and a member of the 
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe. Id. at 358. Custom among the tribe was for young 
women, around the age of fifteen, to undergo female genital mutilation 
(“FGM”). Id. Refugee had been spared FGM at the age of fifteen because she 
was protected by her father, who was very influential within the tribe. Id. When 
applicant’s father died her aunt forced her into a polygamous marriage, and 
before she was to consummate her marriage she was required to undergo FGM. 
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Matter of Toboso-Alfonso and In re Fauziya Kasinga, established that 
particular social groups could be comprised of individuals of a 
particular sexual orientation or a particular gender targeted for 
mutilation, respectively.56 
In Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, the Cuban government persecuted 
applicant because of his sexual orientation as a homosexual man.57 
The Cuban government gave applicant the choice to be jailed for four 
years in a penitentiary or to leave Cuba for the United States.58 
Applicant opted to leave Cuba during the Mariel boatlift of 1980.59 
The court withheld deportation in Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, and the 
applicant was recognized as a member of a particular social group.60 
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) appealed, arguing 
that homosexuals were not a particular social group.61 The BIA 
rejected INS’ argument stating that “among other showings 
[applicants] must establish facts demonstrating that members of the 
group are persecuted, have a well-founded fear of persecution, or that 
their life or freedom would be threatened because of that status.”62 
Applicant, here, established these criteria.  
In In re Fauziya Kasinga, applicant was a 19-year-old female 
citizen of Togo and a member of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe located 
in northern Togo.63 Custom among the tribe was for young women, 
around the age of fifteen, to undergo female genital mutilation 
                                                                                                                   
Id. Fearing that she would be mutilated, she fled Togo for Ghana and Germany 
by airplane, eventually ending up in the United States. Id. at 358-59. 
56 See Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. at 822; see also In re Fauziya 
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. at 357. 
57 Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. at 820. 
58 Id. at 821. 
59 Id. at 821; see also Susana Peña, “Obvious Gays” and the State Gaze: Cuban 
Gay Visibility and U.S. Immigration Policy During the 1980 Mariel Boatlift, 16 
J. OF THE HIST. OF SEXUALITY 482, 484 (2007). (“[T]he Mariel boatlift began on 
28 March 1980 when a Cuban bus driver took a busload of passengers into the 
Peruvian embassy in Havana to seek asylum. A week later, as tensions 
escalated, [Fidel] Castro announced that anyone seeking asylum would be 
allowed to leave Cuba and pulled back the troops guarding the embassy.”). 
60 Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. at 819, 822. 
61 Id. at 822. 
62 Id. 
63 In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (BIA 1996). 
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(FGM).64 Fearing that she would be mutilated, applicant fled Togo for 
Ghana and then Germany by airplane, eventually ending up in the 
United States.65 In re Fauziya Kasinga established that “the particular 
social group is defined by common characteristics that members of the 
group either cannot change, or should not be required to change 
because such characteristics are fundamental to their individual 
identities.”66 
The particular social group standard was further developed and 
clarified by the BIA in In re C-A- and Matter of S-E-G-.67 These cases 
provide that, in addition to the immutable characteristic requirement, 
particular social groups had to “be socially visible, and particularly 
defined.”68 In re C-A- expanded the particular social group category by 
stating that the “social visibility” of members in a claimed group is an 
important element for identifying the existence of a particular social 
group for asylum purposes.69 Most recently, two cases, Matter of M-E-
V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-,70 have clarified the “social visibility” 
                                                 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 358-59. 
66 Id. at 366. 
67 See generally In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006). Colombian applicant 
befriended a member of the Cali drug cartel and became an informant to the 
General Counsel of the city, who prosecuted the drug cartels. Id. at 951. 
Applicant argued he was persecuted because of his relationship to both 
individuals. Id. at 953. The court incorporated immutability of past experience 
and social visibility into their determination of whether applicant was part of a 
particular social group. Id. at 958-61. The court found applicant did not 
demonstrate that he was persecuted based on his membership in a particular 
social group. Id. at 961. See also Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582-86 
(BIA 2008) (establishing the “particularly” element for the particular social 
group standard). Respondents were youth in El Salvador who were persecuted 
by the gangs and harassed for refusing to join the gang. Id. at 579-80. 
68 Applying for Asylum, supra note 53, at 2. 
69 In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. at 959-61. 
70 See generally Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2014). 
Respondent was persecuted by “members of the Mara Salvatrucha gang [who] 
beat him, kidnaped [sic] and assaulted him and his family while they were 
traveling in Guatemala, and threatened to kill him if he did not join the gang.” 
Id. at 228.; see also Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 215-18 (BIA 2014). 
Respondent, who was a former member of the 18th Street gang, claimed he was 
a member of a particular social group after “members of his former gang 
confronted him after he left the gang, and he was shot in the leg during one of 
two attacks he suffered. He fled to the United States after he was targeted for 
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element of the particular social group test, which was criticized by 
courts for being confusing and too literal.71 These cases broadened the 
meaning of “social visibility,” and clarified that the meaning was not 
“literal or ‘ocular’ visibility,” but instead was meant to “emphasize 
‘perception’ and ‘recognition.’”72 In both Matter of M-E-V-G- and 
Matter of W-G-R-, the BIA stated, “we now rename the ‘social 
visibility’ requirement as ‘social distinction.’”73 The BIA further 
clarified that “to be socially distinct, a group need not be seen by 
society; it must instead be perceived as a group by society.”74 
Asylum seekers often select “membership in a particular social 
group” as the basis for their asylum application.75 Each case that the 
BIA takes on for review regarding the particular social group standard 
and a claim for a new particular social group adds on to the already 
complex field of asylum law.76 For an individual to satisfy the 
particular social group standard, an applicant must show: (1) he or she 
is a member of a group; (2) the constituent members of the group share 
immutable characteristics, and the group is both; (3) socially distinct; 
and (4) particularly defined.77  
                                                                                                                   
retribution for leaving the gang.” Id. at 209. In both cases the Board clarified 
that the “social visibility” element of a particular social group does not mean 
“literal or ocular visibility” and renamed the element as “social distinction.” Id. 
at 216; Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. at 236. 
71 Linda Kelly, The New Particulars of Asylum’s “Particular Social Group,” 36 
WHITTIER L. REV. 219, 224 (2015). 
72 Id. The argument here is that the perception ought to be from the perspective of 
the individual doing the persecuting and not just any random observer. Id. 
73 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. at 236; Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. at 212. 
74 Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. at 216. The court found that “it is critical that the 
terms used to describe the group have commonly accepted definitions in the 
society of which the group is a part.” Id. at 214. 
75 Applying for Asylum, supra note 53, at l. 
76 See generally Resources for Asylum Claims Based on Membership in a 
Particular Social Group, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., 
https://www.immigrantjustice.org/resources/resources-asylum-claims-based-
membership-particular-social-group (last visited Apr. 16, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/CCN5-RGGX]; see also Reena Arya, BIA Requires Asylum 
Seekers to Identify Particular Social Group, CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR. NETWORK 
INC., https://cliniclegal.org/resources/bia-requires-asylum-seekers-identify-
particular-social-group (last visited May 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/SE2N-
BJEZ]. 
77 Applying for Asylum, supra note 53, at app. B at 9. Readers should take notice 
that this Article only addresses the particular social group standard of the asylum 
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IV. THE GANG’S ALL HERE: AN EXAMINATION OF CIRCUIT COURT 
CASES 
Five cases, factually similar, and posing the same argument, have 
made their way to various circuit courts across the country.78 In three 
of the cases, Martinez v. Holder, Urbina-Mejia v Holder, and Ramos v. 
Holder, the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, respectively, held that, 
for asylum purposes, former gang membership constituted 
membership in a particular social group.79 By way of contrast in 
Cantarero v. Holder, and Garay Reyes v. Lynch, the First and Ninth 
Circuits, respectively, upheld the BIA’s decision to deny the 
petitioner’s argument that former gang members constituted a 
particular social group.80 In Cantarero v. Holder, and Garay Reyes v. 
Lynch, the BIA ruled that former gang members were not a particular 
social group, and thus not eligible for protection under the Refugee 
Act.81 This circuit split is worthy of consideration, and warrants a 
deeper look. 
In 2009, the Seventh Circuit heard Ramos v. Holder and held that 
former gang members constituted a particular social group because 
they meet the “social visibility” factor of the standard; the court did 
not consider the other prongs of the standard.82 Petitioner was born and 
                                                                                                                   
process. It is critical to note that asylum law is a vastly complex form of 
immigration relief.  The process for applying for asylum, which is not the topic 
of this Article, is long and considers many aspects of an asylum seeker’s life.  
Merely satisfying the elements of the particular social group standard does not 
qualify an individual for asylum protections, it is but one aspect of many 
requirements for asylum eligibility. See NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., BASIC 
PROCEDURAL MANUAL FOR ASYLUM REPRESENTATION AFFIRMATIVELY AND IN 
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS (Jan. 2017), 
http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/content-
type/resource/documents/2017-
01/NIJC%20Asylum%20Manual_01%202017_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3LVZ-44XK]. 
78 See Garay Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2016); Martinez v. 
Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 905-06 (4th Cir. 2014); Cantarero v. Holder, 734 F.3d 82, 
83-84 (1st Cir. 2013); Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 362-63 (6th Cir. 
2010); Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 428 (7th Cir. 2009). 
79 See Martinez, 740 F.3d at 913; Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 367; Ramos, 589 F.3d 
at 431. 
80 See Cantarero, 734 F.3d at 86-87; see Garay Reyes, 842 F.3d at 1138. 
81 See Cantarero, 734 F.3d at 87; Garay Reyes, 842 F.3d at 1132. 
82 Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430-31. 
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raised in El Salvador.83 At the age of fourteen he joined the Mara 
Salvatrucha, and was a member for almost ten years.84 In 2003, 
petitioner immigrated to the United States and reconnected with his 
Christian values.85 He feared that if he returned to El Salvador he 
would not be able to rejoin the gang without violating his “Christian 
scruples and that the gang would kill him for his refusal to rejoin.”86 
Petitioner also had MS-13 tattoos on his face and body, and the court 
found that if he had them removed the gang would still recognize 
him.87 The court ruled in the favor of petitioner, supporting its decision 
by reasoning that petitioner met the social visibility element of the 
particular social group standard.88 The court reasoned that “[i]f society 
recognizes a set of people having certain common characteristics as a 
group, this is an indication that being in the set might expose one to 
special treatment, whether friendly or unfriendly.”89 In this case, 
petitioner was a member of an easily identifiable “specific, well-
recognized, indeed notorious gang.”90 
In 2010, following Ramos, the Sixth Circuit heard Urbina-Mejia v. 
Holder.91 Urbina-Mejia was a citizen of Honduras who arrived in the 
United States when he was seventeen years old.92 He had lived in 
Memphis, Tennessee with his mother, and had no criminal record in 
the United States.93 Urbina-Mejia fled his homeland to escape from 
gang life.94 At the age of fourteen, he joined the 18th Street gang, and 
remained a member for three years.95 Urbina-Mejia claimed he 
received death threats if he did not do what he was told by upper-level 
gang members.96 He recalled that other members of the gang taught 
                                                 
83 Id. 428. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 430-31. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 431. 
91 See generally Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2010). 
92 Id. at 362. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 363. 
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him how to use a nine-millimeter handgun, and that sometimes he 
would use a baseball bat to intimidate, and at times harm victims.97 
Urbina-Mejia testified, “he [had] never seriously injured any rival 
gang member” and “he regretted his criminal activities but worried 
that he would be killed if he did not participate.”98 In considering 
Urbina-Mejia’s claim, the court reasoned that “being a former member 
of a group ‘is an immutable characteristic and that mistreatment 
because of such status could be found to be persecution on account 
of . . . membership in a particular social group.’”99 Additionally, the 
court noted that, similar to Martinez, “once one has left the gang, one 
is forever a former member of that gang,” and as such could possibly 
be “recognized by the 18th Street gang and the MS-13 gang as an ex-
gang member if he returned to Honduras.”100 The court held that 
Urbina-Mejia was a member of a particular social group.101 
Martinez v. Holder, heard by the Fourth Circuit in 2014, involved a 
Salvadoran refugee who was a former member of the MS-13 gang.102 
Julio Martinez fled violence in his homeland at the age of twenty and 
moved to Baltimore, Maryland with his family.103 Martinez’s 
stepfather died when he was twelve years old, and like many young 
kids, Martinez found solace and a family in MS-13.104 After joining 
MS-13 in El Salvador, Martinez refused orders from the gang’s leaders 
to commit crimes against his neighbors and left the gang.105 Gang 
members who did not accept Martinez’s departure made multiple 
attempts on his life.106 Martinez fled El Salvador and stayed with his 
                                                 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 366 (citation omitted). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 367. 
102 Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 905-06 (4th Cir. 2014). 
103 Lauren Gold, Caught in the Crossfire, 2014 Art. 14 MD. CAREY L. MAG. 1, 1 
(2014), 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1090&co
ntext=mcl [https://perma.cc/452J-VE44]. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id.; see also Pamela Constable, Former Salvadoran Gang Member Says He’s 
Living Right and Deserves U.S. Protection, WASH. POST (May 18, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/former-salvadoran-gang-member-says-
hes-living-right-and-deserves-us-protection/2014/05/18/1aa2e7e6-dacd-11e3-
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sister in Maryland.107 In Martinez, the court concluded “that the BIA 
erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of the phrase ‘particular 
social group’ by holding that former gang membership is not an 
immutable characteristic.”108  The court found that Martinez’s 
proposed particular social group, “former MS-13 members from El 
Salvador,” was immutable, because “the only way that Martinez could 
change his membership in the group would be to rejoin MS-13.”109 
The court remanded the case back down to the BIA for further 
proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion.110 
Contrary to these decisions, the First Circuit, in 2013, created the 
now-existing circuit split in deciding Cantarero v. Holder.111 In 
Cantarero, the court rejected the argument that petitioner was part of a 
particular social group, holding that being a former gang member is 
not an immutable characteristic.112 The petitioner, Kevin Fabricio 
Claros Cantarero, was born and raised in El Salvador and at the age of 
twelve left El Salvador for the United States to join his parents.113 
Upon arriving in the United States, he became the beneficiary of the 
Temporary Protected Status Program (TPS) and has remained in the 
United States ever since.114 When Cantarero was sixteen years old he 
joined the 18th Street gang.115 Petitioner testified that “he joined the 
East Boston arm of the 18th Street gang,” and tattooed himself with 
various tattoos that identified him as a member, some of which were 
difficult to hide.116 A couple of years after joining the gang, petitioner 
                                                                                                                   
8009-71de85b9c527_story.html?utm_term=.63cc1807d3f8 
[https://perma.cc/J3YH-93G3]. 
107 Gold, supra note 103, at 1. 
108 Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 913 (4th Cir. 2014). 
109 Id. at 906. 
110 Id. at 913. 
111 Cantarero v. Holder, 734 F.3d 82, 86-87 (1st Cir. 2013). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 83. 
114 Id. The text of the Temporary Protected Status (8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(a) (1952)) 
reads, “Temporary Protected Status (TPS): (a) Granting of Status (1) In general. 
- In the case of an alien who is a national of a foreign state (c), the Attorney 
General, in accordance with this section - (A) may grant the alien temporary 
protected status in the United States and shall not remove the alien from the 
United States during the period in which such status is in effect[].” 
115 Cantarero, 734 F.3d at 83. 
116 Id. 
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became afraid of the violent nature of the gang after a gang-related 
shooting occurred when he was out partying one night.117 Shortly 
afterwards, petitioner experienced a religious conversion and left the 
gang, resulting in him being beaten by active members.118 Leaders of 
the gang threatened petitioner, stating that being a gang member was a 
“lifelong commitment and that if he tried to leave, the gang would kill 
him or members of his family.”119 Petitioner argued that, if deported to 
El Salvador, he feared persecution from the Salvadoran branch of the 
18th Street gang because of his decision to leave the gang.120 He felt 
he would be an easy target to rival gangs and police authorities in El 
Salvador because of his gang tattoos.121 
The court in Cantarero recognized that the INA does not define 
particular social group nor does it provide “guidance in the legislative 
history as to its meaning,” but refused to go further than acknowledge 
the lack of legislative guidance.122 The First Circuit notes that its “role 
in the process of interpreting th[e] phrase is quite limited,” reasoning 
that they “must uphold the BIA’s interpretation.”123 Despite 
recognition by the First Circuit that “‘both courts and commentators 
have struggled to define it . . . and read in its broadest literal sense, the 
phrase is almost completely open ended.’”124 Furthermore, the First 
Circuit held that: (1) in offering refugee protections for individuals 
facing persecution, Congress did not intend for asylum protections to 
include violent street gangs;125 and (2) the arguments posed by the 
Sixth and Seventh Circuits are not strong enough to overcome 
Chevron deference.126 The First Circuit disagrees that former gang 
                                                 
117 Id. at 84. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 85. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. (quoting Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1238 (3d Cir.1993)). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 87; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984). The notion of Chevron deference refers to the deference the 
judiciary grants an administrative agency in their statutory interpretation, or in 
other words, their interpretation of statutes and words within the statutes that 
have delegated regulatory authority. See also Valerie C. Brannon & Jared P. 
Cole, Chevron Deference: A Primer, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1, 1 
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members are a particular social group, asserting that the Seventh 
Circuit’s finding is “largely superfluous . . . since, by its reasoning, 
anyone persecuted for any reason (other than perhaps a personal 
grudge) might be said to be in such a [social] group.”127 
In 2016, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Garay Reyes v. 
Lynch and became the latest case to join the circuit split.128 In Garay 
Reyes the court upheld the BIA’s decision that petitioner was not a 
member of a particular social group.129 Petitioner joined the Mara 18 
gang in El Salvador at seventeen years old.130 During his tenure with 
the gang, Garay served as a driver for a few robberies, but soon 
became disenchanted with the violence and lifestyle of the gang and 
decided to leave.131 Fearing for his life, and retribution from the gang 
leader, who had previously announced that anyone trying to leave the 
gang could be punished by beatings or death, Garay went into 
hiding.132 Garay moved to another town, but was eventually found by 
the gang’s leader and shot in the leg.133 A few months later, he was 
attacked a second time by machete wielding assailants.134 At the age of 
eighteen, Garay had his gang tattoo removed and subsequently left for 
                                                                                                                   
(Sept. 19, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44954.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TB8Y-4XLC]. “Congress has created numerous administrative 
agencies to implement and enforce delegated regulatory authority. Federal 
statutes define the scope and reach of agencies’ power, granting them discretion 
to, for example, promulgate regulations, conduct adjudications, issue licenses, 
and impose sanctions for violations of the law. The Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA) confers upon the judiciary an important role in policing these 
statutory boundaries, directing federal courts to ‘set aside agency action’ that is 
‘not in accordance with law’ or ‘in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations.’ Courts will thus invalidate an action that exceeds an agency’s 
statutory authorization or otherwise violates the law. Of course, in exercising its 
statutory authorities, an agency necessarily must determine what the various 
statutes that govern its actions mean. This includes statutes the agency 
specifically is charged with administering as well as laws that apply broadly to 
all or most agencies.” Id. 
127 Cantarero, 734 F.3d at 87. 
128 See generally Garay Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016). 
129 Id. at 1129. 
130 Id. 
132  Id. 
132 Id. at 1130. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
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the United States.135 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that substantial 
evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion that Garay’s proposed group 
lacked social distinction and as such was not a cognizable particular 
social group.136 
V. PROCEDURAL: CHEVRON DEFERENCE 
The Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council recognized the importance of deferring to an 
administrative agency in determining certain issues of law.137 To 
decide whether an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute 
ought to be granted Chevron deference, courts must determine whether 
Congress has spoken on the issue in question.138 If Congress has 
spoken on the issue, and its intent is clear, the administrative agency 
must give effect to Congress’ expressed intent.139 If Congress has not 
spoken on the issue, and a statute is found to be “silent or ambiguous 
. . . a court may grant deference to an agency’s interpretation where it 
is a permissible construction of the statute.”140 The Supreme Court has 
long “recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an 
executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is 
entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to 
administrative interpretations.”141 As one New York Time’s article 
reported: 
In today’s regulatory world, agencies often step in to 
fill the gap, putting forth their own interpretation of a 
statute. The principle of the Chevron case says that a 
federal court will defer to a federal agency’s views. 
One rationale for this doctrine is that an agency, with 
                                                 
135 Id. 
136 Id.at 1138. 
137 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984). 
138 See Kersh, supra note 7, at 166. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
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its expertise, is better positioned than a judge to know a 
statute’s meaning.142 
Thus, Chevron deference is an important doctrinal element to consider 
when analyzing legal issues regarding administrative agencies, 
specifically in regard to quasi-judicial entities like the BIA.143 It is not 
disputed that Chevron deference applies to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ decisions, or interpretations of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act.144 In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
the “principles of Chevron deference are applicable to this statutory 
scheme.”145 The Court noted that the Attorney General has “delegated 
to the BIA the ‘discretion and authority conferred upon by the 
Attorney General by law’ in the course of ‘considering and 
determining cases before it.’”146 Therefore, the BIA “should be 
accorded Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms 
‘concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.’”147 
Thus, the refusal of circuit courts to give deference to the BIA in the 
aforementioned cases is significant because when a circuit court 
reverses an administrative agency it has good reason.148 The fact that 
three circuit courts have held contrary to the BIA on the issue of 
whether former gang members constitute a particular social group 
should be a compelling basis for both the First and Ninth Circuits to 
reverse the BIA.149 
In holding contrary to the BIA on whether former gang members 
constitute a particular social group, the circuit courts took into 
consideration the Chevron deference doctrine.150 In Martinez the court 
                                                 
142 Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Agencies Decide Law? Doctrine May Be 
Tested at Gorsuch Hearing, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/business/dealbook/neil-gorsuch-chevron-
deference.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/SD54-5U4G]. 
143 See id. 
144 See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516 (2009). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 517 (citation omitted). 
147 Id. (citations omitted). 
148 See generally Brannon & Cole, supra note 126, at 1. 
149 Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 906 & 909 (4th Cir. 2014); Urbina-Mejia v. 
Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 365-66 (6th Cir. 2010); Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 
429 & 431 (7th Cir. 2009). But see Cantarero v. Holder, 734 F.3d 82, 86-87 (1st 
Cir. 2013); Garay Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2016). 
150 See Martinez, 740 F.3d at 909. 
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stated, “in conducting our review, we generally give Chevron 
deference to the BIA’s statutory interpretations, recognizing that 
Congress conferred on the BIA decision-making power to decide such 
questions of law.”151 However, procedurally, the court found that: 
[b]ecause the decision . . . was issued by a single BIA 
member, it does not constitute a precedential opinion, 
as a precedential opinion may only be issued by a 
three-member panel . . . . When issuing a single-
member, nonprecedential opinion, the BIA is not 
exercising its authority to make a rule carrying the 
force of law, and thus the opinion is not entitled to 
Chevron deference.152 
Thus, in Martinez, the court did not grant the BIA Chevron deference, 
though the court did give the BIA’s opinion some weight.153 In 
Urbina-Mejia, the court, stated that “substantial deference is given to 
the Board’s interpretation of the INA . . . unless the interpretation is 
‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’”154 The 
Sixth Circuit held that as a matter of law, the Board erred in finding 
that petitioner was not part of a particular social group.155 Although the 
Sixth Circuit denied petitioner’s request, it held contrary to the BIA 
that former gang members do constitute a particular social group, but 
could not reverse the BIA’s decision because petitioner failed to 
provide corroborating evidence to support his asylum claim.156 In 
Ramos, the court did not discuss Chevron deference in its opinion; 
however, the court did note that the opinion was “characteristically 
terse, [and delivered by] one-member” of the panel.157 Similar to 
Martinez, the court did not give deference to the BIA decision because 
it was written by one-member.158 
Much deference, however, was given to the BIA in Cantarero, the 
court stating, “[b]ecause we are confronted with a question implicating 
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152 Id. at 909-10. 
153 Id. at 910. 
154 Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 364. 
155 Id. at 367. 
156 Id. at 367-68. 
157 See generally Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 429 (7th Cir. 2009). 
158 See generally id.; see also Martinez, 740 F.3d at 909-10. 
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‘an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers,’ we 
follow Chevron principles in our review of the BIA’s decision.”159 In 
Garay Reyes the Ninth Circuit also afforded the BIA Chevron 
deference, stating that “[c]onsistency with the agency’s past practice or 
precedent is not required for an agency interpretation to be due 
Chevron deference; a new or varying agency interpretation is 
permitted, if it is adequately explained.”160 However, the BIA rarely 
adequately explains its variance in decision making, yet it is often 
afforded Chevron deference.161 In this instance, the BIA is not 
providing a reasoned explanation, nor is it adequately explaining its 
decision, rather it is “rewriting prior decisions so they appear to 
conform to the new requirements.”162 The court held that the BIA’s 
articulation of the particular social group requirements are consistent 
with the statute, and reflects the agency’s ongoing efforts to construe 
the ambiguous statutory phrase particular social group is reasonable 
and “is entitled to Chevron deference.”163 However, such deference to 
the BIA by the Ninth Circuit is erroneous, as the “social distinction” 
and “particularity” requirements the BIA refers to are “plainly 
arbitrary, incoherent, and internally contradictory.”164 
Chevron deference is important to consider when arguing that the 
First and Ninth Circuits should have reversed the BIA’s decision in 
deciding whether former gang members constituted a particular social 
group. The First Circuit recognized that “both courts and 
commentators have struggled to define [the particular social group 
standard] and read in its broadest literal sense, the phrase is almost 
completely open-ended.”165 The BIA could interpret and apply such a 
broad and open-ended phrase in an arbitrary or capricious way, such 
                                                 
159 Cantarero v. Holder, 734 F.3d 82, 84-85 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)). 
160 Garay Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 2016). 
161 See generally Kersh, supra note 7; see also Kristin A. Bresnahan, The Board of 
Immigration Appeals’s New Social Visibility Test for Determining Membership 
of a Particular Social Group in Asylum Claims and Its Legal Policy 
Implications, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 649, 669 (2011). 
162 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Garay Reyes v. Sessions 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 
2016), petition for cert filed, (U.S. Aug. 11, 2017) (No. 17-241) at 28. 
163 Id. at 10-11. 
164 Id. at 20. 
165 Cantarero v. Holder, 734 F.3d 82, 85 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 
F.3d 1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993). 
216 UMass Law Review v. 13 | 192 
that the First Circuit should not have given the BIA deference.166 
Finally, Chevron deference was at issue in National Cable and 
Telecommunications v. Brand X, where the Supreme Court held that 
“Chevron deference is not owed to agency interpretations that are 
inconsistent with past interpretations and that are not adequately 
explained by the agency.”167 
A. Arbitrary and Capricious 
Additionally, another reason why the First and Ninth Circuits 
should not have given the BIA deference is that the BIA has defined 
particular social group in an arbitrary or capricious manner.168 It is no 
secret that immigration laws are complex to decipher; application 
should be consistent to assist with the complexities that are 
immigration laws and statutes.169 Scholars have recognized that 
“immigration statutes of the United States are among the worst, 
longest, most ambiguous, complicated, illogical, undemocratic and 
arbitrary laws in the world.”170 This characterization is further 
complicated by the BIA’s arbitrary application and interpretation.  
The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) authorizes courts to set 
aside agency interpretations of statutes if the interpretations are 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”171 As such, an argument can be made that the 
BIA’s interpretation of particular social group has been “arbitrary or 
capricious.”172 This would not be the first time courts have found 
BIA’s interpretation of immigration statutes arbitrary or capricious.173 
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In 2011, the Supreme Court, in Judulang v. Holder, held that the 
BIA’s “policy for deciding when resident aliens may apply to the 
Attorney General for relief from deportation under a now-repealed 
provision of immigration law[]” was arbitrary and capricious.174 In a 
succinct opinion, the Court held that “when an administrative agency 
sets policy, it must provide a reasonable explanation for its action. 
That is not a high bar, but is an unwavering one. Here, the BIA has 
failed to meet it.”175 By striking down the BIA’s policy regarding 
relief from deportation, the Supreme Court did two things: 1) created 
the most rigorous review of an immigration agency’s action under the 
APA to date; and 2) affirmed the viability of the “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard as a meaningful avenue of challenging the merits 
of an immigration agency action under either the APA or Chevron.176 
Legal scholars have also recognized that the BIA fails to meet or 
provide reasonable explanation for why it makes the decisions it does, 
and that it often crosses into making decisions that are arbitrary and/or 
capricious.177 Additionally, the BIA has made interpretations of the 
particular social group standard that are inconsistent.178 The BIA’s 
interpretations cannot be relied upon to deliver consistent results to 
assist in future decisions because there is no consensus regarding the 
exact meaning of particular social group.179 
The First Circuit in Cantarero accepted the BIA’s reasoning by 
rejecting the petitioner’s argument that he was a member of a 
particular social group.180 The First Circuit acknowledged that the BIA 
first interpreted the phrase particular social group in Matter of Acosta 
as referring to “a group of persons all of whom share a common, 
immutable characteristic.”181 The court then noted that “in subsequent 
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decisions, the BIA elaborated that the proffered characteristic must 
make the group socially visible and sufficiently particular.”182 Finally, 
the court highlighted that the BIA denied petitioner’s claim of a 
“proposed group on the grounds that recognizing former members of 
violent criminal gangs as a particular social group would undermine 
the legislative purpose of the INA.”183 The court noted that they did 
not find this interpretation unreasonable or impermissible; even though 
it could be argued to be arbitrary and capricious for failing to 
acknowledge that petitioner met the particular social group standard, 
and at a minimum ought to be afforded the opportunity to submit an 
asylum claim.184 
VI. CIRCUIT COURT CASES AND THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP 
STANDARD 
Of the five grounds for asylum delineated in the Refugee Act,185 
the particular social group is the one that is most heavily scrutinized 
because its boundaries are ambiguous.186 This ambiguity allows 
individuals who fear returning to their country of origin, but do not fit 
the other four categories, to seek asylum.187 On the other hand, the 
ambiguity of the particular social group standard makes it so that 
deserving groups are arbitrarily denied protections under asylum 
law.188 
How, then, do courts determine which groups are deserving of a 
particular social group distinction and which are not? Because the 
particular social group category does not have a statutory definition, 
the BIA and appellate courts are free to interpret the statute as they see 
fit.189 This Article argues that the First Circuit erred in its decision that 
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former gang members are not a particular social group.190 The 
argument that Congress did not intend “to include violent street gangs” 
in its offering of refugee protections does not stand because there have 
been other groups, of similar characteristics, that have been granted 
asylum under the particular social group category.191  
A. Former Gang Members are a Particular Social Group 
The First Circuit held that “a former gang member was still a gang 
member.”192 Rejecting the argument that former gang members are a 
particular social group, the First Circuit discredits the arguments made 
by the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.193 However, the First 
Circuit is wrong; former gang members are a particular social group, 
as they meet the test set forth in Matter of Acosta.194 
1. Former Gang Members: Immutable Characteristic 
The court in Martinez asserted that “[a]t the outset . . . Martinez’s 
membership in a group that constitutes former MS-13 members is 
immutable,” because the only way to change this immutable 
characteristic is to rejoin the MS-13, which violates a fundamental part 
of petitioner’s conscience.195 MS-13 members share common, 
immutable characteristics; namely, “their past experiences together, 
their initiation rites, and their status as Spanish-speaking immigrants in 
the United States.”196 Past experiences, by their very nature are 
immutable, because they have already occurred and cannot be 
undone.197 This finding could also be applied to a particular social 
group of former members of the 18th Street gang, as all former gang 
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members, regardless of specific gang affiliation, share common 
immutable characteristics.198 
The petitioner in Urbina-Mejia argued that changing such an 
immutable part of an individual “would be [an] unconscionable [thing] 
for [asylum seekers] to change” because it is “a characteristic that 
either is beyond the power of an individual to change or is so 
fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be 
required to be changed.”199 The BIA held that petitioner had failed to 
“show that the characteristic which he possesses is so fundamental to 
his identity that it would be unconscionable for him to change it.”200 
However, the BIA was incorrect in its holding, because it is beyond 
the power of a former gang member to change the status of a “former 
gang member,” unless they rejoin the gang and become an active gang 
member.201 Martinez reasoned that “[Martinez’s] repudiation of gang 
membership, along with its violence and criminality, is a critical aspect 
of his conscience that he should not be forced to change.”202 
2. Former Gang Members: Particularity 
The criterion of “particularity” within the particular social group 
standard refers to “whether the group is ‘sufficiently distinct’ that it 
would constitute a ‘discrete class of persons.’”203 This term, 
“particularity,” establishes that it is critical to consider how a group is 
described, and that it be described in a way that is commonly accepted 
within the society in which the group is a part.204 The group must be 
“discrete and have definable boundaries–it must not be amorphous, 
overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”205 
Former gang members meet the particularity requirement. Within 
their society, former gang members are a “discrete class of persons,” 
specifically, former gang members, not active or inactive gang 
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members.206 This “definable boundary” and discrete distinction 
immediately separates these former gang members from any other 
types of gang members.207 Thus, the argument that the MS-13 and 
18th Street gangs constitute a particular social group is plausible.208 
Determining whether an individual is a former gang member is 
straightforward; they either are or are not; however, there is ambiguity 
as to whether the MS-13 or 18th Street gang are merely gangs because 
they are known for their notoriously violent ways, whose influence 
and reach is transcontinental, leading some sociologists to consider 
them powerful criminal syndicates.209  
3. Former Gang Members: Socially Distinct 
In Matter of M-E-V-G-, the courts renamed the social visibility 
criterion of the particular social group test as “social distinction.”210 
The courts never imposed ocular visibility as a prerequisite for a viable 
particular social group, as not all groups will encompass visible 
characteristics.211 Courts recognized that some particular social 
groups, with social distinction, “involved characteristics that were 
highly visible,”212 and other particular social groups that were not 
visible.213 The social distinction terminology refers to a particular 
social group that has recognition within the society of which they are a 
part.214 
Most individuals living in Central America, where gangs are 
prevalent, can easily recognize and identify members of the MS-13 
and 18th Street gangs.215 The argument remains that they might not be 
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able to identify former gang members as easily.216 The Ninth Circuit 
argued that former gang members should not be considered a 
particular social group because “the category of non-associated or 
disaffiliated persons . . . is far too unspecific and amorphous.”217 
However, the Sixth Circuit in Ramos held that petitioner was a 
member of a “specific, well-recognized, indeed notorious gang, the 
former members of which do not constitute a ‘category . . . far too 
unspecific and amorphous to be called a social group.’”218 
In Matter of W-G-R-, the BIA found that former Mara 18 gang 
members do not meet the “social distinction” requirement for a 
particular social group.219 The BIA held that, although there is some 
evidence of societal views towards former gang members, it is difficult 
to discern whether “discrimination occurs because of their status as 
known former gang members or because their tattoos create doubts or 
confusion about whether they are, in fact, former, rather than active, 
gang members.”220 That logic, however, is faulty as it does not 
consider how the persecutors of former gang members view this group 
as socially distinct.221 The BIA further stated that the social distinction 
ought to be based on the perception of society in general rather than 
the persecutor because basing social distinction on the perception of 
the persecutor could lead to groups being defined solely by the 
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persecution they face.222 However, the BIA fails to consider that 
asylum seekers are seldom perceived by society in general, but rather 
are perceived by the perpetrators as socially distinct when the 
perpetrator decides to persecute an individual.223 
B. Former Gang Members Are a Particular Social Group 
1. Arbitrary and Capricious: BIA’s Application of the 
Particular Social Group Standard 
The BIA’s application of the particular social group is arbitrary 
and capricious because it considers separate aspects of the particular 
social group test when it makes its decisions. The court in Lukwago v. 
Ashcroft reasoned that “what constitutes a ‘particular social group’ [is] 
difficult to discern.”224 The BIA’s application of such a phrase differs 
by circuit.225 The First, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have all 
adopted the BIA’s approach, which defined the term particular social 
group as a group composed of individuals who share a “common, 
immutable characteristic.”226 The Second Circuit has defined 
“particular social group” as “individuals who possess some 
fundamental characteristic in common which serves to distinguish 
them in the eyes of a persecutor.”227 The Ninth Circuit recently 
changed its definition to harmonize with the BIA’s definition, and now 
recognizes that a “‘particular social group’ is one united by a voluntary 
association, including a former association, or by an innate 
characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of 
its members that members either cannot or should not be required to 
change it.”228 
The Sixth Circuit in Castellano-Chacon recognized that the 
definition of particular social group is a “flexible one, which 
encompasses a wide variety of groups who do not otherwise fall within 
the other categories.”229 The BIA’s application of the particular social 
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group standard is quite arbitrary.230 The same circuit issued two 
different rulings on cases based on similar facts.231 The Sixth Circuit, 
in Urbina-Mejia, held that the BIA was wrong in finding that 
petitioner was not part of a particular social group,232 while in a 
factually similar case, Castellano-Chacon, the Sixth Circuit upheld the 
BIA’s decision that a former gang member was not a particular social 
group.233 
In Castellano-Chacon, the petitioner was a native of Honduras, 
who at eighteen joined a New York branch of MS-13, just two years 
after illegally entering the country.234 A few years later, petitioner 
decided to leave the MS-13 gang because of the perpetual violence 
within the gang, and because so many members were being jailed.235 
Castellano-Chacon applied for asylum, but was time-barred from 
applying because he had missed the one-year statute of limitations.236 
He then applied for withholding of removal, which does not maintain a 
one-year deadline, and wherein “the courts consider the same factors 
to determine eligibility for both asylum and withholding.”237 
Castellano-Chacon alleged he had a fear of persecution based on his 
membership in a particular social group.238 The court held that he did 
not maintain such a membership.239 The court further held that 
“external perception of a group is a relevant factor to consider in 
making a determination as to whether a group” is a particular social 
group.240 Admittedly, the court did state that “it is possible to conceive 
of the [former or present] members of MS-13 as a particular social 
group,” but petitioner here does not argue that as the basis of his 
membership.241 
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Petitioner in Castellano-Chacon was time-barred from requesting 
asylum, and instead opted to request for a withholding of removal.242 
Procedurally, withholding of removal and asylum are different, such 
that there is no time bar for a petitioner to request withholding of 
removal as there is in asylum, but the factors for determination remain 
the same.243 In a withholding of removal, just as in asylum, the 
petitioner must show their “life or freedom would be threatened in his 
or her home country on account of one of the same five grounds 
necessary for asylum (race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion).”244 Because the 
substantive legal factors remain the same for withholding of removal 
and asylum, the particular social group discussion in Castellano-
Chacon is relevant and applicable to the argument of this Article. 
The differences between the groups asserted in Ramos, where 
petitioner argued that they were part of a group of former gang 
members,245 and Castellano-Chacon, where petitioner argued they 
were part of a group of “tattooed youth” who also happen to be former 
gang members, are nuanced.246 Despite the distinction, the BIA 
applied the particular social group test arbitrarily and inconsistently 
because it considered separate aspects of the particular social group 
test in making its determination.247 It is incomprehensible that a circuit 
court granted Chevron deference to the BIA, when its varied 
interpretation of the particular social group standard seems quite 
“arbitrary and capricious.” 248 The courts have found that: 
[T]he legislative history of the INA fails to “shed much 
light on the meaning of the phrase ‘particular social 
group’” [and] given the ambiguity of the language, 
[the role of the court] is limited to reviewing the BIA’s 
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interpretation, using Chevron deference to determine if 
it is a “permissible construction of the statute.”249 
This Article posits that the BIA should not be given deference when its 
interpretation and application of a statute is arbitrary and capricious. 
C. Bad Actors as Protected Particular Social Groups 
The First Circuit held, and supported the BIA’s reasoning, that 
“recognizing former members of violent criminal gangs as a particular 
social group would undermine the legislative purpose of the INA.”250 
It is worthwhile to note that the INA bans certain individuals from 
obtaining immigration relief.251 Merely establishing a characteristic, 
such as membership in a particular social group, is one of the many 
requirements for asylum, and proving one’s membership in a 
cognizable group does not entitle an applicant any form of relief.252 
Under the INA, bans from gaining asylum relief would include 
“persecutors and those who have committed a ‘serious nonpolitical 
crime.’”253 However, these bans should not have any bearing on 
whether the applicant is an actual member of the claimed particular 
social group.254 These bans should only come into effect after the 
applicant is deemed to fall within one of the five protected 
categories.255 The argument that Congress “did not mean to grant 
asylum to those whose association with a criminal syndicate has 
caused them to run into danger”256 is unpersuasive. Former gang 
members should be recognized as a particular social group, just as 
former members of brutal criminal gangs are.257  At the very least, 
courts should entertain the argument that former gang members 
constitute a particular social group, and remand back to the BIA to 
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make such a finding or require the BIA to explain its reasoning when it 
fails to make the finding. This was the case in Koudriachova v. 
Gonzales, when the court found the argument that former KGB agents 
could be a particular social group persuasive, stating that “it appears 
that the BIA may have misapplied its own Acosta test in reaching this 
determination.”258 In other words, the court held that former KGB 
agents were not a particular social group, and remanded the case back 
to the BIA to either classify the petitioner as a member of the 
particular social group or explain why it could not.259 These groups, all 
similar in nature, are groups that are perceived as “groups whose 
members had formerly participated in antisocial or criminal 
conduct.”260 These groups have been afforded asylum protections, 
despite their violent pasts, and their arguments that they are a 
particular social group have been heard and strongly considered in 
their favor.261  
In Gatimi v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit held that a former 
member of a violent Kenyan tribal group, the Mungiki, was a member 
of a particular social group.262 Francis Gatimi joined the Kikuyo group 
called the Mungiki in 1995.263 The group is known as “a thuggish 
army terrorizing Kenya with extortion rackets and gruesome 
punishments.”264 The group also requires women, including wives of 
members and of defectors, “to undergo clitoridectomy and 
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excision.”265 Gatimi defected from the group in 1999 and not long 
after the group broke into his home looking for him.266 Unable to find 
him, they killed his servant instead.267 In one instance, the group 
kidnapped and tortured petitioner and released him only after he 
promised to produce his wife for circumcision.268 Petitioner left Kenya 
and applied for asylum in the United States.269 
The Seventh Circuit reversed the BIA’s decision that the petitioner 
was not a member of a particular social group, refuting the BIA’s 
argument that petitioner did not meet the “social visibility” criterion 
for determining a particular social group.270 The court criticized the 
BIA for its inconsistent application of the “social visibility” element 
stating that “when an administrative agency’s decisions are 
inconsistent, a court cannot pick one of the inconsistent lines and defer 
to that one.”271 Further, “such picking and choosing would condone 
arbitrariness and usurp the agency’s responsibilities.”272 The court 
found that the Mungiki constituted a particular social group because 
Gatimi met the prongs of the particular social group standard.273 The 
BIA had refused to recognize Gatimi as a member of a particular 
social group because he had not met the “socially visible” prong of the 
standard.274 The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, claiming it 
“makes no sense” because the Board has not attempted “in this or [in] 
any other case, to explain the reasoning behind the criterion of social 
visibility.”275 The Board has been “inconsistent rather than silent. It 
has found groups to be ‘particular social groups’ without reference to 
social visibility.”276 
In a similar case, Koudriachova v. Gonzales, the Second Circuit 
held that the BIA misapplied its own test when it held that KGB 
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intelligence agents that defected to the United States were not 
members of a particular social group.277 The petitioner in 
Koudriachova was a native of the former United Soviet Socialist 
Republic (USSR), who was drafted into mandatory service by the 
Soviet military when he was eighteen years old.278 Not long after 
joining the military, petitioner was drafted into the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (“MVD”), which was comprised of “a special group of troops 
responsible for guarding secret military objects and locations, 
controlling riots in prisons and student towns, and fulfilling special 
assignments relating to terrorism and saboteur groups.”279 
After completing his term of military service in 1983, and during 
his third year at the Institute of Meteorology, petitioner was 
summoned to report to the KGB Intelligence Service headquarters.280 
Petitioner was chosen by the soviet government to work with the 
Intelligence Service agency as a spy.281 He did not wish to be a KGB 
agent, but felt he had no other choice.282 During his tenure as a KGB 
agent, and before he attended spy school, petitioner worked 
undercover as a spy at a factory that employed many foreign 
specialists.283 Petitioner would often report to a supervisor within the 
KGB on information he had obtained from his co-workers.284 As the 
date neared for petitioner to attend spy school, he decided that he was 
going to defect to the United States.285 Petitioner distanced himself 
from his KGB supervisor by relocating homes.286 Not long after 
moving, two men attacked him on the street; petitioner believed the 
two men were sent by the KGB.287 Petitioner and his family eventually 
left the USSR and entered the United States with visitor visas on 
September 20, 1992.288 
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The court in Koudriachova held that the BIA misapplied its test to 
determine whether a group constitutes a particular social group.289 In 
the initial underlying BIA case, the BIA concluded that petitioner was 
not a member of a particular social group.290 The BIA reasoned that 
“because the evidence did not establish that defected KGB agents 
maintain ‘any associational relationship’ or share ‘any recognizable 
and discrete characteristics,’” they were not a particular social group – 
this is incorrect.291 The Second Circuit noted that “[n]o such 
associational relationship is required” to make a particular social group 
determination.292 While the court did not explicitly state that KGB 
agents are not a particular social group, it did not uphold the BIA’s 
decision and instead remanded the case back down to the BIA.293 
The court did not make issue of the fact that Koudriachova had 
been a part of a criminal syndicate, nor did the court in Gatimi.294 
Petitioners were involved in organizations that are notorious for 
perpetuating criminal acts against other individuals.295 Both the 
Seventh and Second Circuits failed to raise those issues against 
petitioners when determining whether these asylum seekers might be 
eligible for asylum as members of a particular social group.296 The 
INA offers other bars to keep dangerous individuals from receiving 
asylum protections, after the issue of whether they are members of a 
particular social group has been resolved. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Five circuits have addressed whether former gang members 
constitute a particular social group under asylum law.297 Three circuits 
have accepted the argument that former gang members were a 
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particular social group298 and two others have rejected it.299 The two 
circuits rejecting this position erred in their decisions because former 
gang members constitute a particular social group, for being a former 
gang member is an immutable quality that cannot or should not be 
required to change.300 Additionally, former gang members are a 
socially distinct group, especially when considering how they are 
viewed by their persecutors.301 Lastly, other groups, similar in nature 
to former gang members, have been given the particular social group 
distinction and have been afforded asylum protections.302 Because 
persuasive case precedent exists, former gang members should, 
undoubtedly, be deemed, and considered, a particular social group; 
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similar to other groups that are unquestionably recognized as 
particular. 
In August 2017, a petition for writ of cert with the Supreme Court 
was filed on behalf of Garay Reyes, petitioner of the Ninth Circuit 
case Garay Reyes v. Holder.303 In January 2018, the petition was 
denied by the Court.304 However, it is worth noting that petitioner, in 
his petition, asserted the arguments delineated in this Article, 
unequivocally stating that the BIA should not have been afforded 
deference by the Ninth Circuit due to its arbitrary and capricious 
application of the particular social group standard requirements.305 
Counsel for petitioner argued that former gang members are a 
cognizable particular social group and meet the requirements set forth 
by the BIA through a number of precedent-setting decisions.306 It is 
unfortunate that the Court denied the writ of cert, because the Court 
missed an opportunity to articulate with specificity what a particular 
social group is; or at the very least, provide guidance in the context of 
former gang members.307 The Supreme Court has tradition of 
chastising the BIA for being arbitrary or capricious, and this case 
could have further admonished the BIA’s penchant for making 
arbitrary decisions without providing adequate explanations for 
them.308 While it was not the proper time for the Court to consider this 
case, it is an issue that warrants attention sooner rather than later. In 
this political climate, with the targeting of any and all undocumented 
immigrants in the United States, it would be proper and timely for the 
Supreme Court to consider granting a petition of this sort.309 There has 
never been a better time for the judiciary to address the concerns of 
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immigrants, particularly those seeking asylum, than now.310 It is not 
only former gang members who stand to be victims of violence 
perpetrated by gangs in Central America, but also innocent people who 
have no ties to gangs.311 If gangs in Central America are targeting 
citizens who have no relationship with gangs, what can be said of what 
will happen to former gang members who have turned their backs on 
the gangs; such gangs function with impunity and have no problem 
killing people to teach a lesson.312 
Julio Martinez, petitioner in Martinez v. Holder, had his execution 
ordered by the gang leader when he departed from the gang.313 He was 
stabbed by a group of attackers and left for dead.314 He then tried to 
flee to another village, but was tracked down and shot at, 
demonstrating that for the gang, nothing but death will satisfy their 
desire for retribution.315 
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